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Referenda can provide citizens with a chance to directly influence specific
environmental policies at the voting booth. There have been strong trends
towards greater direct democracy in the United States, Germany, and Japan in
recent decades. The United States has the longest history with environmental
referenda. Their popularity is growing in Germany and Japan. Influenced in
part by the democratization of the former East Germany following unification,
the use of the initiative referenda in Germany has rapidly expanded. In Japan,
despite an absence of fundamental procedures for, and familiarity with citizen-
based voting initiatives, the 1990s saw expanded use of the initiative referenda
to influence the political process at all levels of government, particularly in
regard to environmental issues.
The upswing in the use of referenda in Germany and Japan is an indication of
local-level dissatisfaction with traditional forms of decision-making and the
powerful demands of citizens to participate more directly in decision-making
processes that affect them. Not all referenda are alike, however. Referenda are
diverse in form, process, and outcome.
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For example, in Japan referenda can only occur when they are explicitly
permitted by local assemblies. This greatly restricts the number of referenda
that have been held in Japan. In Germany, questions of taxation and official
salaries are not allowed to be brought to a referendum. This prevents Germany
from facing the kinds of problems caused by Proposition 13, an initiative that
capped property taxes in California in 1978 and that triggered a firestorm of
anti-tax political protest across much of the rest of the United States. Nor do
referenda always lead to environmentally favorable outcomes. In the United
States, referenda were initially a vehicle used by environmentalists to promote
their causes. Of late, however, referenda have also become a tool of well-funded
elite and corporate interests promoting development projects that threaten
environmental interests. A comparison of the use of referenda in Germany,
Japan, and the United States（with special attention to California and Oregon）
suggests not only that the pros and cons of referenda need to be better
understood, but also that the rules governing the use of referenda are critical.
Germanyʼs Mixed Experiences with Direct Democracy
Prior to World War II, Germany had provisions for direct democracy in the
form of popular initiatives, national referenda, and plebiscites. Under the
Weimar Constitution (1919-33), the Reich president was elected by the direct
vote of the people and was given the authority to decree that a law proposed by
the Reichstag (parliament) be presented to the voters as a plebiscite. Adolf
Hitler used the national plebiscite in 1934 to legitimize his combination of the
positions of Reich president and Reich chancellor into the single position of
Führer, or absolute leader of the German people. Since Hitler and the Nazis
used this system of direct democracy to achieve absolute political power, direct
democracy fell into disrepute in the postwar period. The West German Basic
Law that was enacted shortly after the war ended did away with the
plebiscitary elements that existed in the Weimar Constitution. The federal
constitution adopted following German unification in 1990 also imposed tight
restrictions on direct popular voting.
While this was the case at the federal level, several of the German states
(Länder)―Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hesse, Nordrhein-Westfalen, and Rhein-
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land-Pfalz―introduced provisions for initiatives and referenda directly at the
end of the war. In the 1970s Baden-Württemberg and the Saarland joined these
Länder. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, other German Länder introduced
referenda, so that by 1994 the right to initiatives and referenda had spread to
most parts of Germany. Today in most of the Länder, there are provisions for
popular participation in the proposing and amending of laws, on constitutional
reform issues, and in decisions to dissolve state legislatures. Still, referenda are
not common at the Länder level, which between 1946 and 1992 saw only 23
referenda. Seven of these, moreover, were referenda on the establishment of
Land Constitutions in the American and French zones in 1946-47 and in North
Rhine Westphalia. Many of the subsequent referenda dealt with voting age
reform, electoral reform, and constitutional reform issues.1)
In Germany, there are basically three stages involved in holding a
referendum. In the first stage, the Volksinitiative (“popular initiative” or
petition), citizens make a formal request to initiate a referendum. This requires
a pre-determined number of signatures (ranging from 3,000 in Nordrhein-
Westfalen to approximately 120,000 in Hesse. The second stage, the
Volksbegehren (“Popular Demand” or Initiative) is based on the collection of
signatures supporting the idea put forth in the petition. Most Länder have a
signature quorum of between 8 and 20 percent of the state electorate although
Brandenburg, Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein require the support of only 4
to 5 percent of the electorate. The third stage, the Volksentscheid (“citizensʼ
decision” or referenda) takes place when the Länder parliament (Landtag)
rejects the proposal as presented in the Volksbegehren. At this stage, the issue
is taken to referenda. The state parliaments also have the right to propose
alternative legislation.2)
Bavaria was the first German state to introduce the referendum; Article 74
of the 1946 Bavarian constitution established provisions for the use of
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referenda. In a 1984 referendum, environmental protection was made a state
priority under the constitution, and the state was obligated to address
environmental concerns. Here 94.1 percent of the voters supported the
referendum. Hesse followed suit in 1991. Bavariaʼ s move also became the
precedent for including environmental protection as a national responsibility in
the unified German constitution.
A 1995 referenda, the fourth ever at the Länder level in Bavaria, expanded
use of referenda to the municipality and local levels. Over the next three and a
half years, 673 citizen petitions were circulated at the municipal level in
Bavaria, leading to 389 referenda. Bavaria is now the most active region in
terms of its use of referenda, similar to California in the United States.
Another strong impetus behind the diffusion of the referenda process in
Germany in the 1990s was the role played by popular protest and direct action
in bringing about the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the United
Socialist Party (SED), and the collapse of the East German regime.
Interestingly, the short-lived constitution passed by the German Democratic
Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, or DDR) in 1990 permitted the
introduction of direct forms of democracy at the Länder and municipal levels.
Though under unification, the GDR constitution ceased to exist, some of the
ideals and language of this constitution influenced the designs of the new
constitutions adopted in the Länder that were once part of East Germany.
Individuals played an important role in promoting the use of referenda. In
1951, Peter Schilinski helped organize the Alliance for a Free Citizen Referenda
(Bund für Freie Volksabstimmung). In 1971, Joseph Beuys played a leading
role in the Organization for Direct Democracy through Referenda (Organisa-
tion für Direkte Demokratie durch Volksabstimmung). These early citizen
campaigns were followed by Action Referenda (Aktion Volksentscheid) in
1982 and Referenda Against Nuclear Power (Volksabstimmung gegen
Atomanlagen), two grassroots efforts that created the basis for the formation
of a network of people willing to support a direct democracy movement. In
1987, a bus was used as the symbol of direct democracy in local campaign
events sponsored by the Omnibus für Direkte Demokratie campaign. The bus
toured the former West Germany to expand a nationwide network of citizen
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activists.
In 1988, the Initiative Democracy (Initiative Demokratie Entwickeln, or
IDEE, which later became the Mehr Demokratie [More Democracy]
campaign) was inaugurated to aid the Referenda Against Nuclear Power. The
IDEE established an office in the same building used at the time by the Green
Party and the Heinrich-Böll Stiftung, a green think tank and international
policy network. Consequently, IDEE had a close working relationship with the
Heinrich-Böll Stiftung, and in the fall of 1988 joined it in hosting a democracy
assembly. IDEE also launched a Magazine for Direct Democracy (Zeitschrift
fuer Direkte Demokratie) and led a campaign to collect 400,000 signatures in
support of a referendum that proposed an immediate ban on the use of
fluorocarbons (Volksentscheid über das sofortige Verbot von FCKW).
Following German reunification, in 1992 the IDEE proposed reform of the
referenda process at the Länder level. It also held an IDEE conference to
reorganize itself and adopted the organizational name of Mehr Demokratie. In
October 1995, it succeeded in winning passage of a referendum in Bavaria
allowing municipal referendum despite the huge hurdles that had made the
holding and passage of the referendum appear highly unlikely.
As of 2004, Mehr Demokratie had 4,000 members, was active in 11 Länder
and had developed an affiliation with the Direct Democracy Research Center at
Marburg University (Forschungsstelle für Direkte Demokratie der Universi-
tät Marburg). Today, it is the main citizen organization in Germany promoting
the use of the referenda process and has among its goals the expansion of the
application of the referenda to address the national problems confronting
Germany and issues confronting the European Union (EU) and its member
countries.
Popular initiatives have become increasingly common in Germany.
According to data compiled by the University of Marburgʼs Research Center
on Citizensʼ Participation and Direct Democracy, as of mid-2008, initiatives and
referenda are permitted in 13,153 townships, special administrative districts,
and cities in Germany. The use of referenda began to grow in the early 1990s,
peaking in 1996 and 1997 with well over 400 referenda per year. In 2007, there
were somewhat more than 300 referenda held across the country. From 1956
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through June 2008 there were 4,642 Initiatives and 2,181 referenda.3)
Not all Länder are equally permissive in the use of referenda. At the bottom
of the list are Bremen, Saxony-Anhalt, Berlin, Hamburg and Thuringia. A
number of reasons explain these regional discrepancies in the frequency of use
of the referenda process. These include the range of policy issues that can
lawfully be decided by initiatives and referenda, the number of signatures
needed on a petition to place an initiative proposal before the public, signature
quorums for the Volksbegehren (initiative), and registration procedures (e.g.
the length of time signatures can be collected and the places they can be
collected).
Referenda have empowered voters eager to oppose projects in their
communities or to alter the status quo. Voters in Schönau, in the Black Forest,
used a referendum to take over the electricity grid and shift local power
production towards a more decentralized and renewable energy focused
system.4) Leipzig held its first referenda in April 2008 on the question of
privatizing municipal businesses. The citizens voted overwhelmingly against
privatization. In May 2008, Berlinʼ s citizens voted against keeping open
Templehoff Airport, used to keep West Berlin functioning during the Soviet
blockade of the city at the time of the famous 1948 Berlin airlift. In Hesse,
citizens voted to stop E.on from building a new power plant. In Saarland, they
voted to oppose the building of a new coal-burning power plant in Ensdorf.5)
Referenda and Environmental Protection in Japan
Influenced by the experiences of Germany, the United States, and other
countries, local referenda began to be used in Japan in the late 1990s although
the numbers of referenda pale in comparison to either Germany or the United
States. As of the summer of 2003, have been held 12 recognized local referenda
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across Japan. The issues addressed by these local referenda vary, ranging from
the construction of nuclear power plants and the relocation of American
military bases, to the siting of industrial waste product management facilities,
proposed dam construction, and local control over nuclear fuel management.
Many of the referenda have been linked in some way to environmental issues.6)
With these referenda, local communities are making popular, frequently
ecologically-based appeals in opposition to efforts by national and local
governments and major corporations to advance industrialization through
construction of nuclear power, industrial waste and other large-scale facilities
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or infrastructure.
While these referenda can be considered a form of “NIMBY” (Not In My
Back Yard)-ism, they are also a sign of growing civic engagement. More and
more Japanese local residents view as unfair attempts by national and local
governing authorities and large corporations to arbitrarily impose industrial
facilities on them.
The Emergence of Local Referenda in Japan
In Japan, like Germany, there is no legal basis at the national level for
decision-making by local ballot initiative. Unlike in Germany, local community
residents who wish to use the vehicle of a referendum must first convince a
local government to enact an ordinance that permits the holding of a
referendum. They must collect signatures in support of establishing a
referendum process from more than one-fiftieth of the registered voters living
in a particular locale, select a representative to present to the local assembly
the petition to create an ordinance, and obtain the approval of the local
assembly. However, local assemblies tend to make decisions based on economic
factors and the connections assemblymen have to Japanʼs national legislature
(the Diet), local governments, and local business and financial organizations.
This means that residents face huge hurdles when initiating referenda. An
example of a failed referendum was that drafted to oppose the construction of
Kobe Airport. This failed even though more than 300,000 signatures (one-
fifth of local registered voters in the affected sub-community of Kobe city) had
been collected. As of 2003, there had only been a dozen successful petitions
across Japan.
Prior to the 1980s, local residents often passively supported plans for
industrial, nuclear energy, and waste facilities from which the local community
might stand to profit, either financially or through infrastructure or other
compensation. However, starting in the 1980s and 1990s, local community
sentiment began to change. A series of nuclear power plant accidents in Japan
and growing concerns about environmental damages, triggered local protests
against various large-scale construction projects. At the same time, there was
growing disapproval over the closed-door and often corrupt decision making
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processes that kept local communities in the dark about their future until it was
usually too late to change plans. As local residents became increasingly aware
of what was happening, they sought to gain public access to previously
secretive information and campaigned to hold local referenda in order to place
important development and environmental issues of concern before the
broader community.
A Local Referendum on the “Maki Nuclear Power Plant”
7)
In the late 1960s, plans for building a nuclear power plant in Maki, a rice-
growing community in Niigata Prefecture, were first secretly drawn up. When
news of this plan was first leaked by the local newspaper in 1969, the land that
had been chosen as the site for the plant had already been purchased under the
pretense of using it for a tourist attraction. Kimi Takeo, then Vice-Governor of
Niigata Prefecture and a future prefectural governor, had his most trusted staff
purchase the property for the power plant. In the early 1970s, Tohoku
Denryoku (Northeast Electric Power Company) unveiled a formal proposal for
the building of the Maki Nuclear Plant. At a Maki local assembly meeting held
to consider the proposal, assembly members needed police protection as they
proceeded to vote 19 to 2 to approve the plan. In the meantime, the oil shock of
1973 led to the passage of three new national laws in 1974 for the promotion of
electrical power development, including nuclear power. The prime minister at
that time was Tanaka Kakue, who was from rural Niigata, and was eager to
industrialize this less developed region of Japan. There was strong central
government support for the building of nuclear power plants in Niigata,
specifically in the towns of Kashiwazaki, Kariwa, and Maki.
In order to win local support for the building of a nuclear facility in Maki,
Tôhoku Electric Company paid the Fishing Industry Joint Union of Maki and
its neighbors nearly 5 billion yen in compensation. Iwamuromura, a
neighboring town, was given compensation from the nuclear Plant Cooperation
Fund. Maki officials, in expectation of receiving their own generous
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compensation from the Nuclear Cooperation Fund, planned the cityʼs budget
accordingly, scheduling hospital renovations and preparations for a waste
management facility. Having accepted compensation, apparently around 28.9
billion yen, Makiʼs future as the site of a nuclear power plant seemed assured.8)
However, construction of the Maki nuclear power plant stalled due to years
of political maneuverings among local political parties, supporting and opposing
the plantʼ s construction. In the meantime, two serious nuclear power plant
accidents occurred: one at Three Mile Island in the United States in 1979 and a
second at Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union in 1986. These accidents raise
doubts over the safety of the proposed Maki plant among local residents.
Moreover, a democratic and population shift was occurring in Maki. There
were an increasing number of new residents settling in Maki, which had
become a “bedroom community”9)of neighboring Niigata City. Consequently, a
proposal for a local referenda was put forward not by the leftist opposition
parties but by people generally considered “conservative” ― respected town
notables and longtime landowners. The local residents of Maki expressed
mixed feelings over holding a referendum, considering it a highly unusual
action, yet they also had a high level of trust in the people promoting the
referenda process.
At The Meeting to Implement a Local Referenda on the Maki Nuclear Power
Plant, it was emphasized that “for Maki, the building of a nuclear plant is a
decision of grave importance that comes once in a lifetime. In order to decide
whether to build a nuclear plant, we must return to the foundations of
democracy and decide by listening to the voices of the residents.” This
referenda “implementation meeting” was an appeal to the people of Maki to
engage in direct democracy. The group backing the referendum sought to
enlist the mayor of Makiʼs support for administering the referenda, but they
were turned down. Makiʼ s mayor resisted stating, “the local referenda is a
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Q）A Japanese neologism indicating a town that serves as a residential area without any industry
of its own.
challenge to [parliamentary] democracy.” Undettered, the six anti-nuclear
power plant citizen groups in Maki joined forces to conduct the referenda. The
independent referendum was held in January 1995 in Makiʼs town hall over a
period of 15 days. The turnout was 10, 378 people, or 45.4% of the entire
population of 22, 858 Maki residents. The result totalled 474 votes for and
9,854 votes against the building of the nuclear power plant.
The committee that implemented the referenda used these results to urge
the mayor to reconsider the plans for the plant. In response, the mayor took a
stance of indifference stating, “This was a vote taken along legitimate
democratic rules.” Several days after the independent local referenda, Tôhoku
Electric made an offer to purchase a piece of land at the center of the planned
construction site. Those promoting nuclear power held a large majority of the
seats in the town assembly, thus ensuring the approval of the land-purchasing
proposal. However, the provisional assembly, which had been gathered to vote
on this issue, was cancelled due to a sit-in by groups opposing the nuclear
power plant, and the selling of the land was postponed. In April a local
assembly election was held. Normally, this election involved the election or re-
election of assembly members who come from powerful local landowning
families. The election usually happens without much fuss, but this time a fierce
battle was waged between candidates representing the landowning families
and candidates who supported the recent local referenda.
The election resulted in pro-local referenda assembly members winning a
majority, 12 of the 22 assembly seats, and the defeat of five pro-nuclear power
plant incumbent members. Three women, who ran on platforms that were anti-
nuclear power plant and pro-local referendum, achieved the highest vote totals.
Following the election, the Maki townspeople expressed their amazement at
the result. Reported comments included “the increase of people who vote based
on their own volition,” and “many. . . felt that this was the last chance to stop
the nuclear plant.” The pro-nuclear power plant groups, in analyzing their loss,
were quoted as saying their defeat resulted from a “sense of distrust among
voters toward the established political parties and systems.” The groups
supporting the ordinance that provided for the holding of the referenda now
proposed a new ordinance that would include a provision requiring the mayor
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“to abide by the majority votes cast by registered voters through local
referenda.” When it came time for the Maki local assembly to consider the
newly proposed ordinance, the pro-nuclear power plant faction managed to
convince two assembly members who had supported the initial ordinance to
join their side to form an opposing majority. Nevertheless, apparently because
of some procedural error by the pro-nuclear power plant faction, the ordinance
managed to pass.
Those in Maki who supported the nuclear power plant next decided to delay
the local referenda beyond the 90-day window dictated in the ordinance. The
pro- and anti-ordinance groups fiercely clashed. The mayor again stated, “I
support parliamentary democracy. I have doubts about the ordinance. The
precedent in this town has been that it is better to proceed by holding meetings
among the assembly members, who are the townspeopleʼs representatives.”
The result of that vote was that the mayor would decide when the local
referenda would be held. But because he did not respond, the Implementation
Committee stated, “the mayor is trying to silence the voices of the people,” and
demanded that the mayor step down, gathering 10,231 signatures, which easy
surpassed the 7,700 signatures (one-third of registered voters) needed under
the law. At first, the mayor expressed confidence in his position, but then
abruptly resigned.
In January 1996, a new mayoral election was held, and Sasaguchi from the
Implementation Committee was elected. Under Sasaguchi, the date for the local
referenda was set, thus paving the way for the first real local referenda ever to
be held in Japan. In an attempt to defeat the referenda proposition, the pro-
nuclear power plant group distributed flyers, invited the public to attend
information meetings and “study groups,” sponsored lectures and symposiums,
and conducted an aggressive publicity campaign. The Tôhoku Electric utility
company and Energy Resource helped fund the pro-plant side. The side
opposing the nuclear power plant also distributed flyers and held study
meetings, inviting critics of nuclear energy from all over Japan to give guest
lectures. The town of Maki itself also hosted a symposium for the purpose of
disseminating “information for making a choice.” The result of the vote: 61
percent (12,478 votes, or 53 percent of registered voters) to 39 percent (7,904
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votes) against the selling of the land. Voter participation was a strong 88.3
percent. Following the election, Mayor Sasaguchi declared, “residents, who
received sufficient materials to think about the nuclear power plant issue,
decided against living with a plant in their town. This vote will absolutely stand
until the passing of this generation, regardless of a change of mayor or
attempts by the assembly to repeal the decision.”10)
The reasons why authorities had decided on the location of Maki and other
nuclear power plants was kept secret and never made public. Shortly before
the local referenda, a government official in Japanʼ s International Trade
Ministry provoked the anger of Maki residents by stating that, in the event of a
nuclear power plant accident, “a sparsely populated area would mean fewer
casualties.” This remark alone may have been one of the main factors
motivating a group of Maki residents to work together to create a process that
allowed the public to make a just decision about the wisdom of the plant free of
political pressure. At the same time, the entire episode served as one of the first
major lessons in post-war Japan in local democratic empowerment.
A Local Referendum on the Mitake Industrial Waste Management Site
Japan produces about 450 million tons of waste annually; nearly 400 million
tons of industrial waste, and 50 million tons of general waste from households.
This waste is largely produced in cosmopolitan areas, but brought to
surrounding rural areas for land filling or incineration. As a result, a battle over
waste management inequities erupted at a national level. Procedural issues also
contributed to the perceived unfairness, as many of the decisions were made
behind closed doors.11)
Toshiwa Industries, a major industrial waste producer with its main offices
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in Kaji, Gifu Prefecture, submitted a request to build an industrial waste
management site in the forests of nereby northern Mitake. Wanting to build a
200 hectare industrial waste site-which would be the largest in Asia-they
exchanged memoranda of understanding with ten households on whose lands
they planned to build this site. Toshiwa Industries paid upfront over 10 million
yen as a deposit on the 100 million yen they promised as compensation. Mitake
residents resisted this proposal at first. Toshiwa Industries then made a
request to Gifu Prefecture for permission to build the industrial waste site in
Mitake. The town, however, did not agree and took its case to the prefecture,
calling the siting “inappropriate” because: “at the mouth of the river just below
the planned waste area there is a head gate for the areaʼs waterworks, and thus
a danger that the treated water from the site could pollute it. The planned area
is also designated as a special area for a national park, and environmental
preservation is favored.”
The townʼs stance changed, however, in 1994. First, the town assemblyʼs
special committee conducted a probe into a possible change in the conditions
that would place “safety first.” They submitted a proposal to the prefecture
promising to “take a forward-looking stance” toward the conditions being
offered for funding of pollution prevention, resident right to entry, and
designing a community of good living. The town sealed an agreement for 3.5
billion yen over a 15-year period with Toshiwa Industries. But the real reason
why the townʼ s leaders signed the agreement remained unknown to the
townspeople. Although it is telling that around 1993, Gifu prefecture began to
insistently appeal to the town to accept Toshiwa Industriesʼ proposal.
In April 1995, former NHK commentator, Yanagawa Yoshirô, won a
sweeping victory in the mayoral race, beating the previous mayorʼs right-hand
man. Yanagawa had spent his junior high and high school days in Mitake; and
his deceased wifeʼ s father was a former mayor of the town. Receiving
passionate pleas from his former classmates to “help change this stagnating
city,” Yanagawa had acquiesced and made the decision to run in the mayoral
race. In July of that year he won. Mayor Yanagawa publicly promised a “clean
and transparent administration.” In April 1996, he persuaded the assembly,
despite abstentions and calls to slow down, to enact an information release
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ordinance which clearly enshrined “residentsʼ right to know” and “the rules of
release to the public.” This was unprecedented in Gifu.
In September 1995, the secret agreement made between the town and
Toshiwa Industries was divulged by a local newspaper. Mayor Yanagawa
sifted through the buried papers and in February 1996 released a query to Gifu
Prefecture entitled, “Questions and Doubts concerning the Mitake Industrial
Waste Management Site Plans.” In that letter, he complained about the lack of
an objective analysis of the scientific, social, and economic consequences of
constructing such a site. He also pointed out that as a site located near the Kisô
River, the possibility of water pollution in the event of an accident was great.
Moreover, when Toshiwa Industries made an offer to buy the land, the purpose
given was not “construction of a waste site,” but “holding of assets” and
“storage for materials.” In addition, Toshiwa Industries had begun to distribute
compensatory fees even before permission had been granted. Moreover, in
September 1994, the Environmental Minister had submitted a ban on the
construction of an industrial waste dump on national, and nationally-funded
parks. However, Gifu Prefecture disregarded this notice and changed the date
of the notice from March 1995 to April 1996. They then announced that it
would not consider any notifications beyond that time. Toshiwa Industries
made a request that abided by the laws of park preservation.
In response to Mayor Yanagawaʼs inquiry, Gifu Prefecture noted in March
1996 that Toshiwa Industries “has set a stricter goal for water quality.” This
responce did not satisfy Mayor Yanagawa.12) In October of that year, Mayor
Yanagawa was attacked and injured, nearly fatally. During the year leading up
to this incident, Yanagawa had been carrying out a personal campaign through
a small newspaper. A bugging device was subsequently found in his home
telephone. Right-wing groups had been threatening and harassing members of
an environmental group who was holding a town study group. Thus, many of
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the townspeople regarded the attack on the mayor as “an act of terror
involving the industrial waste issue.”
The day after the attack, Mayor Yanagawaʼs supporters from the mayoral
election gathered together and decided to schedule a “local referenda to
express their ideas” on the industrial waste dump issue. Ten days after the
attack, a town meeting to eliminate violence was held, and signatures began to
be collected to request an ordinance to implement a local referendum. Three
local environmental groups and the mayorʼs support group spearheaded the
campaign. Numerous townspeople ardently took part in collecting signatures,
and within one week, they had collected 100 signatures, three times as many as
necessary for the request. Tanaka Tamotsu, who was to deliver the request,
hid the original copy of the signatures in a garbage bin and wore a bulletproof
vest for protection against a potential attack.
In January 1997, a meeting was held at the Mitake Town Assembly to
discuss the ordinance for a local referendum that would put the matter of the
industrial waste site construction to a vote. The following are comments made
by participants: “Decisions that would lead to a point of no return were
discussed without the presence of town residents and were proceeded under
the shadow of confidentiality, and were almost passed. Iʼm at a loss as to how
the town, while shouting protests against a bothersome facility, one day
suddenly accepted it. There must have been something going on behind the
scenes.” “The referendum proposal must have made things difficult for the
town assembly. However, past assemblies were so cloaked in secrecy that local
residents were forced to make a direct petition. Also, is it right that a town has
to give its approval for an unwanted facility in exchange for money to be
poured into the town? There was no basic discussion of this issue. The stance
that Mitake had taken in the past had been the easy way out.” “The
townspeopleʼ s will is against building the site. If this had been made even
clearer with the local referenda then the unfortunate incident with the mayor
would never have happened.” “The issue of the local referenda is not limited to
Mitake, but influences the entire nation by creating a new precedent for those
involved in similar predicaments, and is significant as an instructive case.” “I
support the enactment of the public referenda ordinance. The local referenda is
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a vehicle to reinforce and invigorate direct democracy, and its use should be
accepted as an expression of the peopleʼs will.” “Low voter turnout in recent
elections reflects the peopleʼs general apathy. Yet, we are arriving at an era in
which major decisions affecting the course of Japan and its respective local
governments can be made by an alternative of direct ballot.”13) The discussion
led to a vote, and of the 18 members, excluding the assembly chairman, 12
members agreed to the ordinance.
In the meantime, Gifu Prefecture did not slow its efforts to building on the
site. In 1987, Kajiwara Hiraku, originally a construction bureaucrat, moved
from the position of Tokyo City Director to Vice-Governor of Gifu Prefecture, in
1989 he was elected governor whereupon he promptly filled his prefectural
cabinet with loyalists. In 1996, in neighboring Mie Prefecture, the building of
the Nagara River Dam caused great destruction to the environment and
attractied national attention. The Environmental Minister came to inspect the
damage and asked the Minister of Construction to open the dam gates.
Governor Kajiwara threatened, “if the Minister of Construction opens the
gates, I will deter him by force.”
After the public referenda ordinance passed, the gubernatorial elections
were held. Kajiwara won a race supported by large economic organizations.
Still, there were two opposing candidates from Mitake and their combined
votes exceeded Kajiwaraʼs. In the election, Mitakeʼs industrial waste site issue
had been a central topic.
At the Prefectural Assembly, the only opposition was the single seat for the
Communist Party, giving the Liberal Democratic Party overwhelming power.
Gifu Prefecture is the archetypal “conservative monarchy” in which the Liberal
Democratic Party pulls the strings. When Mitaka townspeople visited
prefectural officials to seek a representative to present their opposition letter
on the industrial waste dump issue, not a single member agreed to take on the
job. The Prefectural Assembly had lost its capacity to keep the administration
in check.
When the public referenda ordinance was established, residents and former
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officials of the pro-industrial waste site group established a group for “A
Brighter Mitake,” headed by the former mayor. At the inaugural meeting, the
call was for “an emphasis on nation and prefecture, and the gathering of the
will of the townspeople who have common sense.”
Mayor Yanagawa also began organizing information meetings hosted by the
town. There were over 40 such information meetings held between February
and May of that year. In addition, a symposium was organized in which citizens
concerned with the site, members of local government, and lawyers from
across the country participated.
In late April, the prefecture government announced that it had developed a
revised proposal for the waste facility. This proposal would have a third party
construct and manage the site; it would consist of representatives of the
prefecture, town, and Toshiwa Industries. They also announced that areas
within the national park would be excluded from the site. However, though on-
site inspections were mentioned, the proposal offered no specifics on any
monitoring measures. The fact that the prefecture submitted a “revised
proposal” just before the local referenda implicates it as a likely “derailment
tactic.” It increased the sense of distrust among the people.14)
On the day of the polling, big banners hung from the entrance of twelve
polling booths reading, “June 22 is the day of local referenda. Let us decide the
future of our town.” A businessman said after casting his vote, “This is a crucial
vote. I felt that elections for politicians didnʼt matter because they were all the
same, but with a hazard like this at hand, we canʼt take that chance.” Voter
turnout was 87.5%, far exceeding the goal of 80%. The number of votes
opposing the construction of the waste management site was 10,373 (79.65%,
about 69.7% of the entire constituency), also exceeding the goal of 10,000. In
contrast 2,422 votes endorsed the plan; there were 203 invalid votes. Mayor
Yanagawa stated clearly in the press conference afterwards that the townʼs
property included in the planned site for the waste disposal facility could not be
sold or loaned, thus the plan itself would have to return to square one.
After the local referenda, Mayor Yanagawa stated his fundamental
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understanding on the issue of industrial waste management:
At this point, a great change in thinking is required to deal with the
issue of industrial waste management. For this change to happen, we
must first recognize that the period of enormous production, consump-
tion and waste is over. The keywords for this shift are waste reduction,
recycling, and detoxification. Surely, these things will prove costly. But
this cost should be as equal a burden as possible for everyone as a social
cost. I heard that there is a rule that “waste always moves along the
cheapest road,” but I think this is where the biggest issue with waste
problem lies. The town of Mitake fell victim to this rule. Waste should
not move along the cheapest road.
Also on the site location, the mayor said:
I understand that the prefecture wants to have a waste management
facility somewhere within its boundaries. But there is a difference
between wanting it to be “somewhere” and choosing “anywhere.” I
think it is necessary to nominate several possible locations and to
conduct thorough research on each one of the locations, and then select
one place conclusively. If Owazawa of Mitake was selected through such
a process, I believe that the majority of those who voted against it in the
local referenda, including myself, would have accepted their decision.
People say things like ʻregional egotismʼ and such, but no action was
taken to perform such an investigation. I feel of all the places, why here,
just 50 meters from the Kiso River? 15)
As these two cases of referendum demonstrate, a just method for the
approval of plans and facilities has not yet been established in Japan. These two
local referenda shifted the movement of such decisions from the “controlling
elite” in a democratic direction through freedom of information. As Mayor
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Yanagawa proved, it is possible to solve the problem of location choice by
seeking a more transparent, objective process, narrowing down the candidates
by multifaceted investigation, including technical, social and economic
considerations. This procedure would likely improve public acceptance of final
decisions.
However, there are cases in which such selection processes are impossible.
For instance, if the acceptance of the plan and the facility prove to be
impossible for all areas, we must reconsider whether the nature of such a plan
and a facility can coexist with society and the environment at all. A classic case
is that of the risks of nuclear power plants. In such cases, it is necessary to alter
the plan and the facility so that it can be accepted by the society. If such
alteration is impossible, then we should abandon the plan and the facility
themselves, and consider alternative plans.
Presently the role of the local referenda in Japan is as a political tool with
which to reject plans and facilities imposed from above ― in effect a public
veto. However, as I have demonstrated, the process of organizing a local
referendum creates opportunities to have open debates, and in that process, a
“resolution by consent” can arise.
The United States
Plebiscitary Voting in California
The initiative and the referenda were introduced from Switzerland to South
Dakota and other U.S. states in 1898. During the Progressive Era (1890-1920),
a social reform movement swept across the country. As a result of the reform
movement, in 1911 an overwhelming number of California citizens voted to
amend the stateʼs constitution to establish the initiative and the referenda, the
recall and womenʼs suffrage. Already at this early stage, the debate over the
desirability of the referendum was held. Hiram Johnson, the leader of the
California reform campaign and a Republican governor from 1911-17,
underscored the justice of the decision made by Californiaʼs voters by declaring
in his second inaugural address in 1915, “While I do not by any means believe
the initiative, the referenda, and the recall are the panacea for all our political
ills, yet they do give the electorate the power of action when desired, and they
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do place in the hands of the people the means by which they may protect
themselves.” Johnsonʼs words provoked a strong backlash, especially from The
New York Times. In an editorial entitled “Anti-Democracy in California,” the
newspaper had these acid remarks: “While pretending to give greater right to
the voters [the initiative] deprives them of the opportunity effectively and
intelligently to use their powers … the number and variety of the votes they
are called on to cast does away with all chance of really using sense and
discretion as to all of them.”16)
For several decades following the 1940s, the direct legislation tradition
became less and less influential in American political life. But interest in this
tradition was revitalized at the end of the 1970s. There are several reasons
why this tradition was reborn. First, there was a decline in public trust in
politics during the 1970s in the wake of the quagmires of the Vietnam War and
the Watergate scandal. Second, there was rising frustration with local and
national legislative processes that were ineffective in the face of the gridlock
caused by special interest politics. Third, direct democracy campaigns were
recognized as a means of bringing issues to the attention of the public and
legislative bodies that were otherwise difficult to get on the agenda. Fourth,
successful initiative campaigns increased public interest in direct
democracy.17)
Referenda in California
“In many respects, California is seen as a leader both in the issue agenda of
initiatives and in the development of the process.”18) California initiative
proposals have been held on a variety of policy themes, ranging from taxation
issues to environmental regulation, civil rights, smoking restrictions, auto-
mobile insurance rates, transportation policy, and limits on immigration. While
the ballot initiative has opened up channels for citizensʼ to express their
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political will directly to policy makers, it has also opened up channels for
powerful special interests to try to influence policy development in their favor.
Citizensʼ initiatives have a mixed history. For example, a 1980 petition to
introduce no smoking/ sections in public places, which had strong public
backing, was successfully prevented by Phillip Morris, which launched a major
campaign against government regulation. On the other hand, Proposition 99
(1988), proposing a 25 cent cigarette tax hike, succeeded after anti-smoking
activists formed a coalition with the American Cancer Society (ACS). The
ACS and a group representing doctors spent $1.8 million to achieve victory,
overcoming a lavishly funded $21 million anti-cigarette tax campaign that
included TV advertising run by the tobacco industry. Other examples are the
defeat of Measure A (2006) and Proposition 90. Measure A would have given
property owners the right to demand payment, a waiver of the law, or the right
to sue, if Napa County authoritiesʼ land-use policies (including environmental
protection regulations) decreased the value of their property.19) At the state
level, Proposition 90, similarly supported by property rights activists, called for
an amendment to the California constitution to require the government to pay
property owners for substantial economic losses resulting from new laws and
rules, and limit government authority to assume ownership of private
property. This measure could also have greatly restricted environmental
protection controls. The proposition was defeated in November 2006.20)
In the United States popular referenda and initiatives are commonly used in
competing ways by actors with differing interests―for example, by
environmentalists to support environmental protection and property rights
advocates to restrict land use regulations. There are many examples of citizen
ballot initiatives that have preserved Californiaʼ s environment from urban
sprawl and development. The Greenbelt Alliance, an NGO based in San
Francisco, for example, began working with ballot initiatives in the 1960s to
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preserve open spaces and farmlands and improve the quality of life in the nine
counties grouped together in the San Francisco Bay Area.
Environmental activist Jerry Meral, who runs the Planning and Conserva-
tion League, is credited with developing a “citizensʼ initiative industry.” He has
been behind numerous propositions and has found ways to successfully build
coalitions of sometimes unlikely actors to pass otherwise costly measures. He
was a critical player in building up a coalition of actors to pass Proposition 99
described above. He was also behind Proposition 70 (1988), which authorized
$776 million in bonds to help preserve Californiaʼs natural beauty and wildlife
through the purchase of park lands and coastal areas. The proposal bundled a
large number of specific causes together (such as the protection of specific
tracks of land across the state). Meralʼs efforts were successful in part because
of his ability to pull together environmentalists, builders, farmers, Democrats
and Republicans, sportsmen, private land trusts and major corporations to
support the initiative. After Proposition 70 passed, Meral moved on to help
Proposition 116, the Rail Bond Measure specifying just shy of $2 billion in funds
for inter-city rail, commuter rail, and urban rail transport statewide, to victory
in 1990. As with Proposition 70, Proposition 116 designated specific projects
that would be funded, minimizing the risk that funds would subsequently be
used on pork barrel projects.
At the same time, an entire industry has emerged in California around
running referenda. Political professionals are contracted to do everything from
gathering lists of key voters and signature gathering, to devising television ads
and direct mail solicitations designed to appeal to broad segments of the voting
public. Even though the initiative was supposed to be an exercise in direct
democracy, it has also been perverted to serve purposes that render it difficult
for citizens to participate fairly and equally in the political process.
Running an initiative campaign requires large sums of money and this favors
special interest group lobbyists, wealthy individuals, and corporations.
California’s Proposition 13
No ballot initiative has had as big an impact as Proposition 13, an anti-
property tax ballot initiative passed in 1978 which completely changed the
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Californian political landscape. During the administration of Democratic Party
Governor Edward G. “Pat” Brown (1959-67), the state launched an ambitious
program of massive public works projects, civil rights legislation, and social
welfare protections. Before long, the state began witnessing high population
growth. A large flux of immigrants brought new energy to business, but also
contributed to rising education and other public service costs. The rapid pace
of land development resulted in sky rocketing real estate and housing prices.
Taxes on fixed property assets also rose sharply, resulting in a growing level of
voter disgruntlement.
Reacting to this, Howard Jarvis, a Republican activist created the Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Association in 1978. Speaking on behalf of angry California
homeowners and giving voice to their frustrations, Jarvis became the main
promoter of Proposition 13. With generous financial support from a large
number of homeowners, Jarvis organized a grassroots campaign in support of
the proposition. While fending off opposition from minority groups, college
students, tenants and members of the establishment alarmed by his populist
politics, Jarvis made dramatic appeals that struck a favorable chord with much
of the public. Proposition 13 was passed, and the California “tax revolt” was
launched. Proposition 13 required that taxes on fixed property assets be
reduced and imposed a nearly impossible hurdle to any future property tax
increases as any increase would require a two-thirds vote in favor by the
California legislature.
Proposition 13 led to a significant cut in property tax rates. It capped taxes
on property to one percent of the assessed full cash value of the property and
limited increases to the assessed value to two percent a year. While on the
surface this may seem desirable, it has had numerous problematic affects. Most
of the benefit of this reduced tax burden went to those who already owned
expensive homes and hurt those trying to get into the market, a regressive
result that Jarvis did not focus on during his campaign. A second result was the
advent of a new political constituency, comprised of individuals who had their
property asset position enhanced by Jarvisʼ campaign victory. These
“Proposition 13 babies” became the leading edge of a tax-cutting populism that
rolled over the Democratic and Republican California state political parties and
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began shaping the outcome of public policy formation. A third result was that
local public agencies across the state saw their tax revenues reduced by nearly
half under the mandated property tax cuts. Given an absence of alternative
sources of funding, public financing at the county government level was
especially devastated. This has had major implications for public services in the
state. The problem was further exacerbated in the 1980s when California found
itself facing higher demand for tax revenues, as subsidies from the federal
government dwindled and medical and other costs rose.
In 1986, Proposition 58 added yet more favorable provisions for property
owners in California when they were successful in pushing through an
initiative blocking reassessment transfers of real property between parents
and children. Combined these propositions have led to wide disparities in
property taxation levels, which mainly hurt immigrants and young upwardly
mobile workers. California has led by example. The idea of reducing property
taxes through referenda has spread to over a dozen other U.S. states.21)
A New Shock: The Passage of Proposition 37 in Oregon
To help protect the environment, Oregon has had among the most
restrictive land-use regulations in the United States. For some 30 years,
various interest groups have been looking for ways to bypass these regulations.
Their opportunity came when Proposition 37 passed on November 2, 2004 by a
comfortable 60 to 40 percent margin. The nominal purpose of Proposition 37
was to protect landowner property values by forcing the state to reimburse the
owner if any changes in state, county or local municipal land-use regulations in
any way lowered the property value, such as by restricting development or
subdividing property for sale. Any landowner, even corporate owners, could
demand reimbursement of lost value. Moreover, the measure is retroactive to
any existing cases of lowered property values attributable to regulatory
changes. Thus, a present landowner could submit a claim for reimbursement
for past “damages” suffered by the ownerʼs parents or grandparents. Oregon
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has the distinction of turning into law one of the severest restrictions on land
use policy ever seen in the United States.
The guarantee against lost property value promised in Proposition 37 may
initially seem fair, but is in fact unfair for at least two reasons: it ignores the
interests of the community at large and it ignores the fact that city and town
government planning and imposed restrictions affect, and often enhance
property values and protect the environment.
In the last analysis, Proposition 37 is an expanded version of Californiaʼ s
Proposition 13. As opponents point out the people who in fact profit from
passage of this kind of initiative tend to be land developers. If initiatives similar
to Oregonʼs Proposition 37 and Californiaʼs Proposition 13 spread to other U.S.
states, the kinds of environmental regulatory protections won by citizen
groups like the Greenbelt Alliance will be put in jeopardy. A select minority
will benefit, but at the expense of the welfare and continued viability of the
community at large as well as future generations that are made to suffer lower
property values because of weakened environmental regulations.
Conclusion
As described in this article, in Germany, Japan and the United States,
plebiscitary voting has emerged in response to public discontent with and
criticism of the political status quo and indirect democratic practices.
Differences in institutional structures and rules governing referenda, however,
mean that the potential to employ referenda to promote environmental
protection or protest construction plans differs significantly in these countries.
As we have come to see, there is no legal basis for local referenda in Japan.
Instead, when residents decide they want to settle something through a
referendum, voting regulations must be drawn up by means of a direct
proposal. However, because local assembly members consider such voting an
intrusion on their power, most proposals for direct voting have failed to pass.
Thus the referendum remains a rare event in Japan. In contrast, in Germany
referenda have become common place at the local level, although not in all
Länder. Likewise, referenda are also now a common component of the electoral
process in California.
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Referenda have empowered local citizens and opened up decision making
processes. As all three country examples illustrate, the referenda has become a
powerful tool for citizens interested in protecting the environment. There are,
however, several deeply rooted problems with the direct legislation system
that threaten environmental protections as well, as can be seen with California
Proposition 13 and Oregon Proposition 37. While such measures contain
promises of lower tax burdens that voters find alluring, they are in fact Trojan
Horses for gutting environmental protections. It is not only citizens, but also
development interests that can make use of the referendum. Special interests,
groups moreover, are more likely to have the capital resources necessary to
exploit the powerful influence of the mass media and other public institutions.
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